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ABSTRACT 
Historically, nonprofit organisations in the United States have played a critical 
role in helping people in need by providing education, training, residential, 
counselling and in-kind and cash support. Today, contrary to popular belief, 
most nonprofit service organisations in the United States depend on government 
for over half of their revenues. The paper by Lipsky and Smith considers the 
implications of this relationship between government and nonprofit 
organisations for our understanding of the welfare state in advanced industrial 
countries. They argue that recently the American government has used 
nonprofit agencies to expand the boundaries of the welfare state in a host of 
service categories, from child abuse to domestic violence to homelessness. The 
result is a welfare state that is more expansive than would be the case if 
policymakers relied solely on the public sector. The paper also examines the 
effects of this evolving relationship on the organisational norms of nonprofit 
agencies. These agencies have an emphasis on particularistic responses to the 
individual, while the government requires an equity-based focus in which all 
clients are treated alike. The new funding arrangements mean increased 
government intrusion into the affairs of nonprofit agencies, thereby altering the 
character of social policy and the American welfare state. 
In his paper, 'A Note on Contracting as a Regime', Michael Lipsky explores the 
notion of a 'contracting regime' as a set of "principles, norms, rules, and 
decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a 
given issue-area." Regimes, however, are not simply collections of equal and 
independent entities, but instead are critically influenced by one of the 
participating actors. Specifically, in the contracting regime, nonprofit service 
organisations have changed. Nonprofit human service agencies may now be 
more expansive than they were able to be in the past, but they are also more tied 
to government and more reflective of public priorities than of the community 
values they represented in the past. 
Lipsky then poses a series of questions about the relationship of government and 
nonprofit organisations in Australia. To what extent do government agencies 
articulate separate purposes, priorities and standards? Alternatively, to what 
extent to they endorse current activities of the voluntary agencies from which 
they purchase service? To what extent do government agencies have the capacity 
to articulate the service needs in their sectors? To what extent can voluntary 
agencies take actions outside the relationship defined by the contract to obtain 
public funds and achieve their purposes? To what extent does government 
possess the capacity to enforce contracts? He suggests that in Australia 
policymakers have gone far to achieve the hegemony of government over 
voluntary agencies in service delivery through contracting, but many believe that 
in selected instances there is still considerable ground to be covered. 
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A NOTE ON CONTRACTING AS A REGIME, AND ITS POSSIBLE 
RELEVANCE TO AUSTRALIA 
Michael Lipsky 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
THE CONTRACTING REGIME 
In the United States, government use of contracting with nonprofit agencies 
to achieve public purposes in social services has become widespread. I 
Traditional social welfare agencies such as the venerable family services and 
child welfare organisations now receive the bulk of their revenues from 
government contracts. Perhaps more tellingly, when public officials seek to 
address a new social concern they look for a private agency with which they can 
contract. Since the 1970s, as new social problems-teenage runaways, battered 
women, hunger, homelessness, AIDS hospices-have been accepted as requiring 
public action, policy responses have been the fiscal responsibility of government 
and implementation the responsibility of the voluntary sector. 
We use the term 'regime' deliberately because it indicates a set of 
relationships that transcend simple common practice to suggest a relatively stable 
set of assumptions about the way the world works. As we choose to understand 
the term, a regime is a set of "principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
The material on the contracting regime in this note is drawn from the book, currently in 
development, that I am writing on the subject in collaboration with Stephen Rathgeb Smith. 
Views and questions about the Australian case are based upon informal discussions with 
public officials, policy analysts, and representatives of voluntary agencies in Melbourne, 
Hobart, Canberra, Sydney and Brisbane, in rough order of the extensiveness of the 
discussions. For the most part the discussions were focused on the applicability to 
Australia of the model of relations between government and the voluntary sector that is 
presented in the paper, co-authored with Steven Smith, 'Government Provision of Social 
Services through Nonprofit Organizations,' which has been bound with this note as a 
working paper. I cannot and do not claim to have studied the Australian case extensively, 
but offer these thoughts in the hopes of provoking reactions and clarifications. 
I am grateful to the Urban Research Unit of the Australian National University, and to 
Patrick Troy, for the opportunity to pursue these interests in Australia as a Visiting Scholar 
during the period September to December, 1989. I have benefited from conversations with 
many people about contracting in Australia, but especially from conversations with David . 
Adams, Mark Lyons, and Will Sanders. 
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procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area."2 
The concept has been developed most fully by analysts of international relations 
who have sought to characterise the relatively stable relationships that seem to 
exist, despite the absence of a single entity which could act with authority, 
between countries, and between countries and nongovernmental actors such as 
multinational corporations. The notion of regime reminds us that normal 
systems of interaction, with their own rules, values and sanctioned expectations, 
can and do emerge outside the regularised interactions that ultimately are 
sustained by force of law. 
All actors in a regime do not operate internally on the same principles. This 
is surely evident in international regimes, in which directed economies and free 
market economies, imperial nations and colonies, can still be said to operate 
within regime parameters. And it is not true either for governments and 
voluntary organisations, which operate on different internal values and often 
seek different objectives, but with respect to each other still act according to 
expectations generated by the contracting regime. 
Several additional aspects of the concept of regime are useful for our 
purposes as we have borrowed the term. First, regimes may be said to have 
normal ways of solving certain problems. Before the contracting regime became 
established, newly identified social problems would be confronted, if at all, by 
voluntary organisations which expected no assistance from government, or, as 
the welfare state became more firmly established, by governments which would 
implement programmatic responses directly. Today, in contrast, one may expect 
demands to address new social problems to be met by governments contracting 
with nonprofit agencies to implement responses. The strength of this impulse is 
perhaps illustrated by the current tendency of governments to see to the creation 
of voluntary organisations when none is apparently available with which to 
contract for services. 
Second, the notion of regime provides a way to understand regularised 
interactions among entities whose actions are not ultimately structured by laws. 
One of our tasks is like that of theorists of international relations who needed to 
2 Stephen Krazner, ' Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables,' International Organization, 36, 2 (1982), p. 185. See, generally, pp. 185-205, 
and all of Volume 36, no. 2. 
2 
find a way to explain the regularised patterns of behaviour found among nation-
states and non-nation entities. We seek to understand regularised patterns of 
behaviour among governments and community organisations when the 
community organisations are constructed on different principles from those of 
· government and when community organisations are not fully responsive, indeed, 
are sometimes antagonistic, to governmental institutions. 
Third, participants in regimes are mutually dependent and (because regimes 
are not ephemeral or episodic) relationships among them have a degree of 
continuity. Regimes are also disciplined and self-enforcing in the sense that 
participants in the regime can and will be sanctioned if they stray, if not by 
dominant participants, then by the economic, political and social realities that 
bring them into the regime in the first place. 
As applied to the contracting regime this means that nonprofit organisations 
cannot act freely as if they were in some isolated market for services. Instead, 
they must weigh the consequences of their inclinations to dissent from 
expectations of government in the knowledge that their noncompliance might be 
consequential for their continued well-being. The mutual dependency of 
participants in the contracting regime helps explain why an analysis based upon 
compliance with regime norms through contract writing and enforcement, as 
suggested above, does not fully explain regime behaviours and interactions. 
Fourth, regimes tend to be sponsored and ultimately directed by a relatively 
powerful agent. Regimes, in other words, are not simply collections of equal and 
independent entities but instead are critically influenced by one of the actors 
participating in the regime. In international relations this role is played by 
hegemonic nation-states, that is, by single nations whose values, language, 
currencies, and systems of operations are accepted by others as valid and 
governing of relations within the regime. In the era of contracting, this role is 
played by government. 
As mentioned earlier, contracting between government and nonprofit 
organisations may be understood as a relationship involving reciprocity. But it is 
by no means a relationship among equals. Just as the hegemonic nation-the 
United States in the post-war period, or Britain at an earlier time-bends the 
behaviour of nominally independent nations ,toward its way of doing things 
according to its preferred economic, political and social systems, so government 
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influences the behaviour of independent nonprofit contractors. Like the 
hegemonic nation, government gradually induces other actors within the 
contracting regime to accept its practices and preferred policies. 
To say that there is a contracting regime is not to imply that relations within 
the regime are static. Indeed, one would expect regime relationships to change 
over time in response to changing needs of the regime and new challenges to it, 
so long as the fundamental values that are represented in the regime are 
maintained. 
In the contracting regime nonprofit service organisations have been 
changing. Under pressures to secure and maintain funding and in response to the 
oversight demands of government agencies, they are professionalising and 
becoming more business-like, but at the expense of their responsiveness to clients 
and the extent to which they reflect unique community values. Nonprofit human 
service agencies may now be more expansive than they were able to be in the 
past, but they are also more surely tied to government and more reflective of 
public priorities than of the community values they represented in the past. 
THE NOTION OF THE CONTRACTING REGIME AS AN AID IN 
UNDERSTANDING DEVELOPMENTS IN AUSTRALIA 
A contracting regime may be said to have been put into place in the United 
States over the last twenty years. But this does not mean that the regime is fully 
in place in the United States in all locations or for all social service areas in which 
government seeks to purchase services. In some places government capacity to 
enforce contracts is still low. Individual states may be disinclined to work 
through voluntary agencies, or the existence of voluntary agencies may be so 
modest that governments cannot call upon their capacity to provide services 
because they do not exist in any measure. Nonetheless, the notion of a 
contracting regime may help provide a yardstick against which to measure the 
degree of conformity to a normal state of affairs. 
Similarly, the concept of a contracting regime may assist us in 
understanding the Australian case better even though great variety in the 
experiences of individual states and within individual service areas may preclude 
any overall generalisations. While recognising the difficulties of so generalising, 
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the following questions seem to emerge from discussions with public and private 
sector officials about the efficacy of contracting in Australia at the present time. 
1. To what extent do government agencies articulate separate purposes, 
priorities and standards? Alternatively, to what extent to they endorse current 
activities of the voluntary agencies from which they purchase service? A mark of 
the contracting regime is that government is the primary actor in defining the 
public interest where purchased services are concerned. An effective 
government, of course, will work with all interested parties in trying to achieve 
consensus about service priorities, but for a contracting regime to be in place 
government must know what it wants and be willing to manipulate its spending 
patterns in order to achieve it. 
As in the United States in an earlier era and perhaps still to some degree 
today, not every state government agency in every service sector in Australia 
seems to have been able to break away from being more of a conduit for funds 
than a purchaser of services. Nor, would it seem, is there always broad 
agreement that governments should exercise independent judgments about 
service directions and quality when it comes to funding voluntary agencies. 
2. To what extent do government agencies have the capacity to articulate 
the service needs in their sectors? In some areas government agencies have 
changed service delivery approaches in their sectors with remarkable success. In 
other areas they do not even seem to command legitimacy in asserting what the 
public interest is. Reportedly, the very information they would need to assert the 
public interest is controlled by uncooperative voluntary agencies. Again, if it 
were the case that government could not articulate a separate conception of 
service, one would have to conclude that the contracting regime is incomplete. 
3. To what extent can voluntary agencies take actions outside the 
relationship defined by the contract to obtain public funds and achieve their 
purposes? As service providers, voluntary agencies are likely to participate in 
defining public standards, but this influence must be limited to consultation and 
persuasion if contracts are to have any force. When voluntary agencies have 
separate channels to government, as is said to be the case in Victoria, at least, so 
that their funding does not depend upon their agreements with government 
agencies, the importance of the contract is obviously diminished and public 
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purposes with respect to service delivery will not be achieved through the 
contracting mechanism. 
4. To what extent does government possess the capacity to enforce 
contracts? Governments at the start of contracting developments have typically 
been weak in their ability to hold contractors to agreed upon performance 
standards, and take time to develop such capacity. Meanwhile, contracting 
agencies in a sense are excused from following governmental demands if they 
can assume that they will not be held accountable for performance. 
There is a sense in which government auditing capacity can never be equal 
to the task of policing the myriad voluntary agencies with which they enter into 
contractual relationships. This suggests a critical dimension of contracting and 
brings the discussion of a contracting regime full circle. As we understand it, a 
contracting regime does not and cannot depend upon careful checking and 
verification to achieve compliance with public expectations. It depends instead 
upon combinations of commitment and professionalism that allows the state to 
place dependent people in the hands of private agencies with expectations that 
they will be properly treated despite the fact that public agencies cannot be 
expected fully to monitor the providers of service. 
The old, pre-regime system of simply subsidising voluntary agencies to 
continue their good works could not be sustained because it was and is too 
susceptible to particularism in client selection, inequity in service distribution, 
paternalism in relations with clients, and self-satisfaction in philosophical 
approaches. Governments have been attracted to contracting for many reasons, 
as we point out in the accompanying paper, but once committed to providing 
services through contracting will be led to undermine the service preferences of 
voluntary agencies in favour of service standards that conform more to public 
priorities. To judge from the reactions I have received in Australia to the 
analysis of contracting in the United States, policy-makers in Australia have gone 
far to achieve the hegemony of government over voluntary agencies in service 
delivery, but many also believe that in selected instances there is still 
considerable ground to be covered. 
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GOVERNMENT PROVISION OF SOCIAL SERVICES THROUGH 
NONPROFIT ORGANISATIONSl 
Michael Lipsky 
Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology 
INTRODUCTION 
by 
Steven Rathgeb Smith 
Duke University 
Since the early decades of the American republic, nonprofit organisations 
have played a critical role in helping people in need by providing education, 
training, residential, counseling and in-kind and cash support. Moreover, 
President George Bush has followed Ronald Reagan in calling upon nonprofit 
agencies to take the leading role in American society in addressing social 
problems. Their belief in the efficacy of nonprofits (President Bush's 'thousand 
points of light'), combined with the current political and financial constraints on 
government spending, suggests an even larger service role for nonprofit 
organisations in the future. 
Nonprofit organisations invoke the images of community, voluntarism, 
civic dependability and neighbour-helping-neighbour that have always exerted a 
powerful impression on American public consciousness.2 However, largely as a 
result of this expanded role in providing services for government, these images 
are at variance with the contemporary reality of nonprofit service organisations. 
Rather than depending mostly on private charity and volunteers, most nonprofit 
service organisations depend on government for over half of their revenues; for 
many small agencies, government support comprises their entire budget. In 
contrast to the traditional relationship of two independent sectors, the new 
relationship between government and nonprofits amounts to one of mutual 
dependence that is financial as well as technical; iQ.creasingly, the lines between 
This article has been accepted for publication in the Political Science Quarterly. The 
research was funded by the Future of the Welfare State project of The Ford Foundation. 
We have also drawn upon earlier research on emergency food distribution programs 
supported by the William H. Donner Foundation and on services for victims of crime 
supported by the National Institute of Mental Health. We arc grateful to Paul Dimaggio, 
Peter Dobkin Hall, Henry Hansmann, Ira Katznelson, Ralph Kramer, Reid Lifset, Robert 
Morris, Alice O'Connor, and Edward T. Weaver for helpful comments on earlier drafts of 
this paper. For administrative and secretarial assistance, we arc grateful as well to Tobie 
Weiner. 
2 Robert N. Bellah, et al. , Habits of the Heart (New York: Harper and Row, 1985). 
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public and private are blurred. For instance, a recent survey of the Child 
Welfare League of America concluded that government support comprised, on 
average, 59 per cent of their member agency revenue in 1986.3 On the other 
hand, government relies on nonprofits to provide social services. In 1988, 15 
Massachusetts state agencies were budgeted to spend over $750 million, about 7 
per cent of the state budget, to purchase from over 1,200 contractors such 
services as alcoholism rehabilitation, family crisis intervention, English-as-a-
second-language and daycare. Overall, the state recognises 200 distinct types of 
social services in its purchase-of-service system.4 Until recently, our 
understanding of the development of the welfare state in advanced industrial 
countries assumed that the hallmark of a progressive welfare state was ,a large 
public sector that relegated the private sector to a small residual roll;!. In this 
view, the United States with its smaller public sector and larger private nonprofit 
sector compared unfavourably. The expansion of government contracting with 
nonprofit agencies calls the prevailing view into question. In the recent period 
government has used nonprofit agencies to expand the boundaries of the welfare 
state in the United States in a host of service categories-from child abuse to 
domestic violence to homelessness. The result is a welfare state that is more 
expansive than would be the case if policymakers relied solely on the public 
sector. 
It is also a welfare state which has compromised some of the values that the 
private voluntary sector contributes to social welfare provision. These values 
include the variety, independence and legitimacy of community-based agencies, 
and the capacity of such agencies to pursue distribution policies that tolerate 
responsiveness to clients over equity among clients if the two values conflict. 
Broadly speaking, we reach the following conclusions about the effects of 
government spending in nonprofit organisations and public policy. As 
government funding on nonprofit organisations grows, the pressures on 
government officials to maintain accountability over public funds increases as 
well. Over time, government officials respond to increased reliance on private 
agencies by instituting new regulations, changing contract requirements and 
3 
4 
Karin E. Malm and Penelope L. Maza, Sources of Agency Income (Washington, D.C.: 
Child Welfare League of America, 1988). 
Massachusetts Senate Committee on Ways and Means, Purchase of Service: Protecting the 
Promise of Community-Based Care (Boston: Senate Committee on Ways and Means, 
1986), pp 2-3. Funding for state government contracts with private nonprofit agencies is 
from both state and federal sources. 
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increasing administrative oversight. The effect is to shift the organisational 
norms of nonprofit agencies from their historical emphasis on being responsive 
to the individual to focusing more on treating all clients alike, an orientation that 
be·ars resemblance to that of government service agencies. This shift is 
particularly noticeable in the areas of staffing, client selection and treatment, and 
physical plant. Thus, government may require nonprofit agencies to hire 
professional staff as a condition of receiving a contract. Or government may 
force a contract agency to accept only client referrals from government bureaus 
rather than allowing contract agendes to have the flexibility to respond to all 
clients in need who present themselves to the agency. Government may also 
require a contract agency to modify its physical plant in order to meet official 
standards on public safety and health. Also, we will argue that government 
funding of nonprofit agencies transforms the management of contract agencies 
and the politics surrounding social service expenditure. 
In sum, government spending of nonprofit agencies should not be viewed 
simply as 'privatisation' if this term means reducing or minimising government 
involve.ment in policy matters by turning over responsibility to private agencies 
and providing them with additional funds. Rather, the new public-private 
funding arrangement means increased government intrusion into the affairs of 
nonprofit agencies, thereby altering the character of social policy and the 
American welfare state. 
Our views are based upon systematic research on the development and growth of 
government funding on nonprofit agencies in Massachusetts, supplemented with 
research in Connecticut, New Hampshire a_nd Rhode Island. In addition, 30 case 
studies on nonprofit service agencies were conducted to assay the effects of 
government funding on these agencies and social policy in general. Our findings 
are also based upon previous research on food banks, shelters for the homeless 
and battered women, and rape crisis centres conducted for other purposes. 
Further, we have drawn on our experiences as members of the boards of 
directors of several nonprofit service agencies.5 
5 Steven Rathgeb Smith, Government, Nonprofit Agencies and the Welfare State 
(unpublished doctoral dissertation, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, 1988). Steven Rathgeb Smith and Susan Freinkel, Adjusting the Balance: 
Federal Policy and Victim Services (Westpon, CT: Greenwood Press, 1988). Michael 
Lipsky and Marc A. Thibodeau, 'Feeding the Hungry With Surplus Commodities,' 
Political Science Quarterly, 103, 2 (Summer 1988): 223-244. 
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THE GROWTH AND SCOPE OF THE NONPROFIT SERVICE SECTOR 
Government support of nonprofit service agencies has expanded 
dramatically in the last 20 years.6 Over 50 per cent of federal social service 
expenditures is now devoted to nonprofit organisations; virtually none went to 
such sources in 1960. Advances in daycare, sheltering, counseling, employment 
training and protection from child abuse and neglect have all proceeded through 
government contracting with nonprofit service agencies. Thus, for example, 
when the problems of homelessness and hunger have arisen, the predominant 
response of government has been to launch programs through nonprofit 
agencies . In many states, nonprofit organisations under contract to government 
deliver the publicly funded services in categories such as daycare, foster care, 
protective services for children and adults and community programs for the 
mentally ill and developmentally disabled. 
Government purchase of social services affects vast numbers of people. A 
1986 study of the nonprofit sector in St. Louis indicated that there were over 
2,500 nonprofit service organisations in the metropolitan St. Louis area. Eighty-
five thousand people, or 7 per cent of the local work force, were employed in 
these agencies.? In 1982, over 4 million people worked nationwide for private 
nonprofit health, social and legal service organisations.8 It is undoubtedly fair to 
say that most of these people worked for agencies whose incomes in part 
reflected contract revenues. In Massachusetts, service providers to government 
under contract employed roughly 48,000 persons,9 a number that compares 
6 
7 
8 
9 
See Pacific consultants, Title XX Purchase of Service: A Description of States' Delivery 
and Management Practices , vol. 1 (Berkeley, CA: 1979); Bill Benton, et al ., Social 
Services Legislation vs. State Implementation (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 
1978), p. 110; Ruth Hoogland DeHoog, Contracting Out for Human Services: Economic, 
Political, and Organizational Perspectives (Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 1984), pp. 43-46; Edward T. Weaver, Implications of Alternative Choices To 
Purchase or Direct Delivery Selected Title XX Social Services, (unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, School of Public Administration, University of Southern California, May 
1985). . 
Metropolitan Association for Philanthropy and United Way of Greater St. Louis, 
Philanthropy in Greater St. Louis (St. Louis: 1986), p.6. 
Gabriel Rudney, 'The Scope and Dimensions of Nonprofit Activity,' The Nonprofit 
Sector: A Research Handbook, edited by Walter W. Powell (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1987), p.57. 
Massachusetts Council of Human Service Providers, Confronting Effectiveness: Social 
Investment in Massachusetts, Advance report, May 1988, p.10. 
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favourably with the. number of state workers involved in h~man services.10 
Social service agencies funded by government call upon armies of volunteers to 
supplement the ranks of workers and provide direction through their boards of 
directors. The survey of St. Louis area residents revealed that almost half of the 
adult population (45 per cent) of the region's 900,000 adults volunteered at least 
once during the year in support of area organisations. I I 
The clients of nonprofit agencies of course make up the most important 
constituency of these organisations from a social services point of view. Every 
United Way campaign heralds the numbers of needy people its agencies serve. 
The report of the American Public Welfare Association that 633,000 individuals 
in 23 states received services under the U.S. government's Social Service Block 
Grant in 1988 undoubtedly understates by a. considerable margin the numbers in 
these states served by all the agencies with some public funding.12 
Until the 1960s, most nonprofit service organisations relied upon fees, 
· donations, and in some cases endownment income for revenue. Government 
funding tended to be restricted to a few service categories and generally small-
scale relative to total agency revenues. Only in selected urban areas such as New 
York City was government funding extensive. Typically, these public funds 
would be used to purchase services for a child or adult when there was popular 
support for service provision (for example, residential care for emotionally 
disturbed children) but no government capacity to provide a particular service 
existed. In these cases, government rarely made extensive demands on the 
private agencies, relying on the judgement of the agencies' administrators on 
important iSsues such as treatment and discharge. 
The substantial growth of government support of nonprofit agencies has 
raised the concern of many observers that government funding would have 
10 These figures provide a sense of the scope of the contracting phenomenon but they must be 
interpreted cautiously because often there is no equivalence between the scope of nonprofit 
agencies' activities and those activities for which government purchases services. 
Consider the hypothetical case of a rehabilitation centre of 20 beds employing 50 people for 
which government pays for half the beds and the rest are supponed from other sources. 
The government contract supports the work of all the staff and from that point of view 50 
people are affected in their work by the contract. Yet, strictly speaking, it is possibly that 
only 25 are paid for under the contract. 
11 Philanthropy in Greater St Louis, p.6. 
12 American Public Welfare Association (APWA), A Statistical Summary of the Voluntary 
Cooperative Information System (VCIS) Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) Data/or FY 
1985 (Washington, D.C.: APWA, 1988), p.12. 
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harmful effects on the independence and overall missions of nonprofits and on 
their viability as autonomous, community-based-agencies. The concern is not 
simply of academic interest. Virtually every American is likely to have contact 
with a nonprofit service organisation during any given year-whether it is a 
hospital, a community mental health clinic, a family service agency or a nursing 
home, to name just a few of the possibilities. These organisations serve as 
intermediate institutions between the individual and the state, providing a vital 
link for the citizen and helping to shape citizens' view of themselves and their 
place in society. To the extent that government extends its influence into the 
world of nonprofit organisations and the state, perhaps fundamentally changing 
the life possibilities of citizens and the role of their community organisations. 
THREE TYPES OF NONPROFIT AGENCIES 
Before developing our analysis, we need to make some important 
distinctions that recognise the diversity of nonprofit service organisations. 
Keeping the diversity of organisations in mind should help us avoid analytic 
difficulties encountered by earlier critics who tried to assess the impact of 
contracting on the nonprofit sector in general, without seeing that some kind of 
nonprofit organisations might be severely affected, while others might be 
unaffected. 
One type if the traditional social service agency, the old-line service 
association such as the Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Children, established in 1878. Founded by affluent civic leaders, these agencies 
typically were established many decades before the New Deal. They usually have 
endowments (sometimes very substantial ones), and therefore tend to be less 
dependent on government funds than other agencies. Often they offer many 
different services and programs and thus are also less dependent than other 
agencies on demand for any single service. 
A second type of nonprofit social service organisation is the agency founded 
within the last twenty years directly in response to the availability of government 
funds for job training, mental health, and other services. An example is the Key 
Program, a large youth services agency established in Boston in 1973 to provide 
community and residential services for delinquent youth. These agencies usually 
derive most of their revenues from government. Often they were established by 
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social activists who used government funds to create an organisation dedicated to 
addressing their version of social reform. 
A third type of organisation is the agency founded in response to unmet 
neighbourhood or other community needs. These may be organisations devoted 
to solving problems experienced as local concerns, such as homelessness, hunger 
or runaway youth. Or they may be established to solve problems for 
communities of people who are less identifiable by geography than by some 
other characteristic, such as shelters for battered women, respite care for the 
developmentally disabled, or hospices for victims of AIDS. These organisations 
tend to be started and staffed by volunteers or underpaid workers out of strong 
personal commitments to alleviate the suffering their organisations address, or to 
help other people realise their potential when it is otherwise thwarted by social 
conditions. Particularly at their start, they are typically shoestring operations 
built on shaky financial grounds. 
Seen from the perspective of their relationship to government, these three 
types of organisations form a kind of continuum: at one pole there are the new 
community-based organisations that tend to act most like volunteer 
associations-non-bureaucratic and held together by the freely given 
commitments of its members. At the other pole, there are the org!lnisations 
founded in response to the availability of government funds. These tend to be 
rule-bound, concerned with consistency, and highly responsive to the priorities 
of the government agencies whose grant programs were the occasion for their 
establishment and development in the first place These distinctions are important 
because they suggest that different types of nonprofits are affected by 
government funding priorities in different ways. The most pronounced shifts 
and the greatest conflicts with government occur among those agencies that 
initially resemble government least. In contrast, where nonprofit agencies arise 
directly in response to the availability of public funds, the impact of contracting 
is less pronounced, if only for the reason that such agencies have at their 
inception conformed to government contracting expectations. For all these 
agencies, however, some degree of change is virtually inevitable as government 
contracting increases. As we shall see during the course of this analysis, 
government contracts eventually create difficult organisational dilemmas for 
nonprofit organisations: whi~e contracts may allow an agency to expand 
services, pay their staff better salaries and move into new service areas, contracts 
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bring administrative and accountability demands which may conflict with an 
agency's mission. 
THE IMPERATIVES OF SERVICE ORGANISATIONS 
Public and private service organisations share many characteristics: the 
need to process clients through systems of eligibility and treatment, to field a 
staff, to be effective, and to account for financial expenditures. Also, they are 
expected to pursue a similar range of objectives. They are expected to be fair 
(equitable); to accommodate likely and unanticipated complexities (responsive); 
to protect the interests of sponsors in minimising costs (efficient); to be true to 
their mandated purposes (accountable); and to be honest (maintain fiscal 
integrity). 
Simultaneous pursuit of a handful of objectives, however, means that the 
objectives are likely to come into conflict with one another. Adherence to rules 
may insure equity, for example, but may be pursued at the expense of 
responsiveness. A guidance counsellor may be fair in allocating to each advisee 
exactly the same amount of time, for example, but this formula would surely be 
counterproductive if some students needed li~tle help and others needed special 
attention. 
Modem govemnients must use universalistic criteria in client selection or 
develop elaborate rationales for favouring one group over another. In contrast, 
the different emphases of nonprofit agencies allow some nonprofit organisations 
to pick and choose their clients on the basis of some group characteristics, such as 
place of residence or ethnic background. They also allow ' creaming' to a greater 
degree, for example, screening out clients with the lowest educational levels, 
severe mental illness, or, in the case of private schools, children with handicaps 
who are disruptive or costly to serve. Such screening is rationalised as 
appropriate to the focused mission of the organisation and because these excluded 
or 'hardest to reach' clients are deemed to be the responsibility of the public 
sector. 
However, government service agencies are not free from bias in client 
selection and treatment either, although such practices are generally 
unsanctioned. Workers in government agencies often discriminate against the 
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poor through efforts to control the demand for services despite the official 
policy of their agencies to serve everyone in need.13 
In sum, nonprofit and government service organisations should not be 
analyzed as radically different in their approaches to clients. Rather, they should 
be understood as sharing the same organisational service norms, although in 
different measures. To understand the effects of government 'contracting out' to 
nonprofit organisations we therefore must start with an appreciation of the 
different weights that governmental and nonprofit agencies accord to 
organisational imperatives. 
EQUITY AND RESPONSIVENESS IN GOVERNMENT AND NONPROFITS 
In the distribution of social policy benefits, government is overwhelmingly 
driven by concerns of equity. So long as scarcity of resources requires 
government to make choices among claimants, policymakers will seek to impose 
norms of equity or at least give the appearance of fairness in resource 
distribution. Public officials require a rationale for public action that legitimises 
the fact that in the use of public resources some will be helped and others not. 
Government requires not only unambiguous eligibility criteria, but also 
unambiguous indicators that people meet those criteria. Even if eligibility 
categories are clear, proof in meeting those standards must be unambiguous if 
benefit distributions are to be fair.14 Unambiguous indicators include age (over 
65 in social security, three to 21 in special education), and prior government 
service (e.g. veterans status). Slightly more ambiguous but still able to meet the 
appearance of fairness are indicators of income and assets. 
Government, to be sure, also pays attention to responsiveness. But even in 
some concerns over responsiveness, the primacy of equity is illustrated in the 
ways in which policies designed to be responsive historically have been 
structured to conform to norms of equity. Consider, for example, public 
13 See Michael Lipsky, Street Level Bureaucracy (New York: Russell Sage, 1980), Ch.8. 
14 It is no good to have clearly defined eligibility slots if evidentiary standards are slack. A 
residency requirement only works to insure equity among service recipients if proof of 
residency is required, standards of proof elaborated (a lease, an identification card, a 
postmarked letter), and the requirements enforced. 
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welfare payment rules that attempt to respond to unique family circumstances 
and differences in work-related expenses, housing costs and assets. To achieve 
responsiveness within the strictures of equity, welfare agencies have developed 
policies that recognise differences but are articulated in increasingly elaborate 
formal rules. 
Nonprofit service agencies weigh equity and responsiveness differently than 
government. Indeed, the traditional nonprofit organisations were distinguished 
from providers of public benefits precisely because they were particularistic in 
their choice of clients. We are reminded of this particularism by the names of 
many of these agencies that have come down through the years: The Catholic 
Charitable Bureau, and the Jewish Family and Children's Bureau in Boston, for 
example. 
Consistent with this particularism, nonprofit agencies are less concerned 
that government in serving all clients within a specific target group; instead, 
nonprofits focus on serving clients compatible with the agency's service mission. 
For example, shelters for battered women tend to conceptualise their role as 
offering an important service alternative to traditional health and welfare 
organisations for some women. Government, in contrast, prefers that all 
agencies providing counseling services to abused women provide similar service 
so that a minimum standard of equivalent care should prevail across all agencies. 
Furthermore, there is much less need for independent verification and much 
more trust of clients' testimony in private, nonprofit agencies than in 
government. Nonprofit agencies consequently invite criticism from government 
officials that service is being provided inefficiently or inequitably. 
These general tendencies of nonprofit agencies lead to two different 
responses to clients that sometimes leads to conflicts with government agencies. 
First, if people say they are hungry, or homeless, or recently assaulted and 
fearful for their safety, nonp!ofit organisations are inclined to accept such 
testimony as sufficient. Government officials, upholding the equity 
requirement, cannot tolerate such an accepting attitude. 
To be sure, nonprofit organisations recognise potential problems arising 
out of a generous intake policy. If challenged, nonprofit organisations deal with 
the possibility that some people will take advantage, o~ become 'freeloaders ', in 
several ways. First, they may acknowledge that there are costs to increasing the 
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accuracy of program targeting, but calculate that they will accept a small degree 
of 'advantage-taking' because the cost of reducing 'advantage-taking' would be 
too high in organisational effort and morale. Second, they may defend their 
policies by pointing to the rationing impact on clients of certain barriers to 
seeking aid. Entry into the orbit of a homeless shelter, for example, may mean 
losing privacy, or agreeing to accept counseling, taking a make-work job, giving 
up one 's weapon, or exposing oneself to a religious message. Third, they may act 
to reduce the accessibility of services, by raising the eligibility threshold for 
those who would take unfair advantage, or even cutting back services if too many 
untargeted clients begin to appear. Rather than directly confront clierits who 
seemed to be freeloaders, for example, a mobile van feeding the homeless in 
Boston simply moved to a new location when too many people who did not 
appear to be homeless (but may have been hungry) began to line up for a free 
meal. 
A second response of nonprofit agencies to clients is to reject clients deemed 
incompatible with their service mission or restrict their intake to clients within 
their primary mission area. The former may lead to'creaming' with, say, the 
very poor or severely disabled referred to other programs. The latter may lead 
to a focus on a specific community (e.g., co-religionists), even though citizens in 
other communities may need service. Either situation can lead to charges by 
government officials that nonprofit agencies are not providing service to the 
'neediest' clients, who unambiguously are deemed 'deserving' . 
EXPLAINING THE PRIMACY OF RESPONSIVENESS 
The primacy of responsiveness over equity in private, nonprofit agencies 
follows from their origins, the people who work for them, and their structure of 
accountability. Many nonprofit social service providers tend to be 
neighbourhood or community based. Workers or volunteers in these agencies 
are more likely than government workers to know individual clients, their 
families , and their circumstances. Moreover, it is a strength of such 
organisations that their workers are -presumed to be interested in claimants as 
individuals even if they do not actually know them. For example, a shelter for 
battered women may be staffed by other women who empathise with the victim's 
plight and want to make her feel safe through personal contact. Thus they are 
inclined to know people seeking help in a holistic way. Unlike government 
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administrators of rule-bound eligibility standards, providers in private service 
agencies resist reducing clients to their bureaucratically relevant characteristics. 
Supporting these propositions is the voluntary nature of personnel in 
nonprofit organisations. When workers cannot be presumed to b'e motivated by 
bureaucratic incentives, other mechanisms to insure worker conformity to 
organisational tasks must operate. Such mechanisms include providing workers 
with a sense of well-being derived from valuing their work and convincing them 
of its importance, and supporting workers' desire to give expression to altruistic 
impulses. It also means that, if the organisation depends upon them for labour, 
volunteers and workers who are not primarily motivated by income 
considerations have a certain power in the organisation. (It also follows that as 
agencies 'outgrow' their dependence on volunteers they will not have to cater so 
much to their implicit demands). 
Voluntarism in nonprofit agencies takes many forms. The newer agencies 
are often founded by social activists, sometimes based in religious communities, 
who are committed to solving certain social problems, sometimes at great 
personal sacrifice. They may receive no pay for their efforts and work 
unusually long hours. Many shelters for battered women, far example, were 
founded by volunteer women who had a particular vision of addressing the 
problem of spouse abuse. 
Aside from agency founders, social service agencies are often staffed by 
volunteers (possibly former clients) whose work is given at least in part in 
exchange for the felling of well-being they get from helping in the organisation. 
For some who work in nonprofit organisations, the transactions between 
providers and clients themselves may be the point of their involvement in work 
that otherwise seems hopeless. People volunteer or work for low pay in drug 
treatment storefronts, foodbanks and legal advice centres not because they expect 
fully to solve the problems these agencies address, but because they find altruistic 
behaviour rewarding. 
In the more established agencies, professional staff members often work for 
low salaries by comparison to what they could earn in government or elsewhere. 
In Massachusetts, for example, salary ·disparities between the private and the 
public sector for direct care positions are said to range from 12 to 29 per cent. 
Thus many workers in nonprofit agencies must be considered at least in part 
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volunteers, who take at least some of their compensation in non-monetary 
form.15 
In addition, emergency services are likely to be governed by volunteer 
boards consisting of community activ:ists or leaders playing traditional civic 
roles as supporters of nonprofit agencies. Such people may be relatively single-
minded in their willingness to pursue the interest of their organisation's clients 
without regard for competing organisational interests. 
Board members of traditional agencies, for example, in the past regularly 
permitted their organisations to make up deficits by spending the endowment, 
believing that they were trustees for needs that had to be met. (They were also 
surprisingly tolerant of management that incurred annual losses). Board 
members of younger agencies may have come out of a social movement 
environment in which they too, perhaps even more aggressively, may be willing 
to support their agencies In pursuing responsive client policies. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND 
NONPROFITS 
Several corollaries that find their way into actual practice follow from these 
differences in orientations between government and private, nonprofit agencies. 
First, in contrast to government, nonprofit agencies are more tolerant of client 
selection procedures that are not based upon rigid standards of equity-both in 
client selection by staff and . client self-selection. Nonprofit organisations are 
more willing to say that they can help some people and not others. 
Private agencies are also more comfortable with self-selection. They act as 
if first-come, first-served is an adequate decision rule when resources are scarce 
and need is great. If they apply rationing mechanisms to discourage people who 
perhaps are less needy, the mechanism tend to be advisory rather than definitive. 
15 The gap in saldries between public and private workers is a matter of growing concern 
· within the nonprofit community. In Massachusetts, this concern has led to ongoing 
political action to gain legislative approval for salary upgrading to correct disparities. See 
'More Salary Upgrading Issut:s'. The Provider, 8, 6 (June 1987), p. 5. 
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Second, nonprofit agencies strive to be responsive to individual clients, even 
at the expense of other policy objectives. Government agencies, though, try to 
spread resources evenly over affected populations. For example, many child 
welfare advocates have complained over the years that the long-term 
involvement of some nonprofit agencies with their clients led to inappropriate, 
excessive treatment of many children, both in residential centres and foster care. 
It also meant that there were fewer resources available to a burgeoning client 
population. In the 1980s, government control of the purse strings and a reaction 
against long-term treatment has produced new policies aimed at limiting the 
length of time children spend in residential centres and foster care. · 
Third, public and private agencies to a degree are both likely to define 
agency clients in terms of their ability to be effective with them. But government 
agencies are more likely to define the scope of the client population primarily to 
achieve greater consistency with equity, rather than the ability of the agency to 
be effective. This tendency is noticeable in at least two distinct instances. 
In one instance, government will define unrealistically large catchment 
areas that, while providing formal 'coverage' for all, cannot because of distances 
reasonably serve many of the people in the areas. This situation commonly 
occurs with homeless shelters, mental health services and food distribution 
centres in many rural and other underserved areas. 
In another instance, government will seek to narrow eligibility criteria, for 
example, by lowering income limits, or imposing more severe distress 
requirements, in order to be able to serve a greater proportion of those people in 
the pool. Thus, government will appear to assist a larger proportion of those 
clients defined as eligible to receive assistance under the policy. 
By contrast, nonprofit agencies are more likely than government to prefer a 
relatively large pool of potential clients, primarily because it allows a nonprofit 
agency to manage its client selection process in a way that is consistent with its 
sense of mission. Thus, a large pool of potential clients for shelters for battered 
women means that the shelters will be able to serve women deemetl responsive to 
their particular treatment orientation. And, shelters will be in a stronger 
position to reject individuals who may be perceived as potentially disruptive. 
This situation is particularly true of various residential programs: group care 
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for children, emergency shelters for adolescents and shelters for battered women 
and the homeless. 
There is also a financial consideration involved in the preference for a large 
client pool. Since most nonprofit agencies are of modest size and severely 
undercapit;lised, a small pool of pote!ltial clients may be insufficient to 
guarantee a steady stream of clients-and hence revenue-into the agency, 
producing major financial and organisational strains on the agency. 
The differences between government and nonprofit agencies regarding the 
appropriate size of a nonprofit agency's client pool is evident in the recent 
political conflict over participation in the Women, Infants and Children 
Supplemental Nutrition Program (WIC). Federal officials have strived to target 
aid to the poorest and most distressed women and children; nonprofit WIC 
distributors have wanted to retain a more expansive definition of eligibility. It is 
also evident in the assignment of public daycare slots to welfare recipients. In the 
program to distribute surplus agricultural products to the hungry, federal 
officials sought to persuade states to restrict eligibility to families with lower 
incomes so that a higher proportion of eligibles would receive free cheese and 
butter. 
There are important political considerations in conflicts over the size of the 
client pool. If one's objectives include maintaining pressure on public authorities 
to act more vigorously with respect to a target population it makes sense to 
support an expansive conception of the needy group. The larger the numbers of 
people who cannot receive help from a program for which they qualify, the 
more pressing the claim that not enough resources are being applied to a 
recognised problem, particularly if need cannot strictly be defined by income. 
This is why it is disingenuous for public officials to maintain that their interest in 
restricting eligibility to the 'truly needy' in any program is based solely on their 
desire for more effective targeting. To limit program eligibility criteria is 
simultaneously to reduce political pressures to expand program resources 'to 
meet the need. 
21 
GROWTH OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING WITH NONPROFIT 
AGENCIES 
Despite the differences in organisational norms between government and 
the nonprofit sector, government officials are utilising nonprofit agencies to 
deliver public services at an unprecedented rate. Let us now take a brief look at 
the advantages public officials believe accrue government that may attract them 
to contracting with nonprofit agencies. These reasons have varied in importance 
to public officials over the period that contracting has been ascendant. 
1. Government agencies can respond to emerging service needs more 
quickly and effectively by contracting than by mounting new efforts utilising 
public employees and public agencies. 
2. Public officials can purchase specialised services that would be 
difficult to find or develop within government ranks. 
3. By using nonprofit agencies, public officials recognise that they can 
change program direction with relative impunity, and can cut back on services 
more easily than they could if public employees were involved. 
4. Government agencies can take advantage of the legitimacy already won 
for program initiatives of private organisations while avoiding the political costs 
that would be associated with attempting to usurp their role. 
5. In contracting, government shifts the political and financial risks of 
providing service at least in part onto the nonprofit sector. 
Beyond these pragmatic reasons for encouraging contracting, other motives 
for contracting appear to operate as well. In particular, contracting for services 
is viewed by some analysts as a way to shift resources and responsibilities to the 
private sector, thereby reducing the role of government in public policy and 
halting the post-war rise in government's size and influence. This would be 
accomplished because of two additional advantages often thought to accompany 
contracting. 
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6. Government will save money, because competition among agencies 
bidding for government contracts will result in efficiencies spurred by 
competition. 
7. Government will save money because nonprofit contractors tend to 
pay lower wages and employ volunteers, allowing government to contract at low 
prices. 
As a result of these aspects of contracting many analysts believe a new 
dynamic will arise in which public services will be sustained at a high level of 
quality by competition in the private market.16 This view is in error. It is based 
upon a model of independent buyers and sellers when in reality, as we have 
suggested, the world of government and service providers is one of mutual 
dependency. It is faulty because it is inherently difficult to hold human service 
providers accountable for the quality of performance outcomes. Hence, 
improvements in service quality and increased savings while holding quality 
constant are unlikely to be achieved in contracting for human services. 
Moreover, this view neglects recognition of the political interests that form 
around government's new way of doing business and the new clients of 
government (the nonprofits) that are created by contracting activities and are 
thus in a position to make demands. Contracting is not simply an administrative 
procedure that changes the mode of service delivery from public to nonprofit (or 
'forprofit'). Rather, it fundamentally alters the politics of public service 
delivery. Over time, this new politics brings issues of equity, and issues of 
community autonomy, to the fore. 
CONSEQUENCES FOR NONPROFIT SERVICE ORGANISATIONS 
Critics of government contracting often express concern that nonprofits 
may compromise their original service mission in the process of responding to 
government priorities.17 However, it should be noted that government 
16 Many public choice economists subscribe to this view. Their arguments are reviewed by 
Dehoog, p.7. Also, see Peter F. Drucker, The Age of Discontinuity (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1969), Ch.10. 
17 See Nathan Glazier, 'Towards a Self-Service Society', The Public Interest 70 (Winter 
183): 63-90. This view is disputed, among others, by Ralph M. Kramer, 'Voluntary 
Agencies and Personal Social Services', The Nonprofit Sector, pp. 240-257 
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contracting requirements may alter nonprofit agencies' approaches to services 
and clients even if their goals are entirely compatible with those of government. 
In essence, they may be forced to conform to standards imposed by contracting 
policy at the expense of their homegrown notions of what constitutes effective 
service delivery. 
In the following section, we discuss the tradeoffs between government 
demands for accountability and nonprofits' conceptions of effective services in 
terms of three areas: staffing, clientele and program, and facilities. Two caveats 
apply to these generalisations. First, the extent to which nonprofits will find 
government accountability demands onerous is likely to vary depending upon 
.. whether the agencies had previously been independent of government influence, 
as suggested above in our discussion of three types of nonprofit agencies. 
Second, while we focus on conflicts between governmental and private 
conceptions of service we do not mean to imply that the contracting parties are 
invariably in conflict or always troubled by differences in perspectives. Rather, 
our essay is intended to highlight inherent conflicts under contracting 
difficulties, and the places where differences in perspective are most likely to 
result in compromising requirements for the nonprofit sector. 
Staffing 
The people who arise to establish and direct community organisations are 
often not the people government officials regards as most appropriate to lead the 
organisations with which they contract. For example, shelters for battered 
women and rape crisis centres, developed and directed by nonprofessional 
feminist activists, have been encouraged and sometimes required to hire human 
service professionals as a condition of funding . Public officials have considered 
the founders of the shelters too ideologically oriented and insufficiently trained 
to meet what they regard as the therapeutic and coping needs of shelter clients. 
Emergency housing shelters also have been pressured to add (and, indeed, 
sometimes welcomed) social workers to their staffs. 
If these examples illustrate government concerns over accountability, other 
staffing requirements demonstrate the press of efficiency considerations. In 
recent years, many , mental health centres, job-training programs and child 
welfare services, have been forced to lay off professional staff as state and 
federal officials reduced funding support. 
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At times, these reductions were required simply because of insufficient 
government funds. However, government officials also have forced layoffs 
because they charge that nonprofit agencies did not need as many staff members 
to provide quality service. For example, a traditional child welfare agency had 
obtained a government contract in the 1970s to provide protective services. In 
the early 1980s, state officials gave the agency the choice of either terminating 
the contract or reducing the degree of its staff's involvement with clients. The 
· agency decided to give up the contract and has struggled financially ever since. 
Other agencies subjected to the same pressures accepted the state's conditions and 
changed their service profiles. 
In the requirement to hire social workers or psychologists, staff upgrading 
results. In the case of staff layoffs, deprofessionalisation occurs, as workers are 
less able to use their own judgement in responding to clients' needs. Both cases 
illustrate the imposition of governmentally-derived requirements on private 
nonprofit agencies. They also highlight that government is interested in 
obtaining minimum standards of care: in the case of new agencies such as 
shelters established through nonprofessional auspices, government seeks to 
establish minimum care standards through professionalisation; in traditional 
agencies with high levels of professional care, government concerns with higher 
productivity leads to a reduction in professional standards. 
Clientele and Program 
One way in which these pressures for equity and accountability are 
particularly felt is in government's concern over the apparent open-endedness of 
enrollment in some community services. Thus government agencies are likely to 
pressure emergency service providers: to establish or clarify and elaborate 
eligibility standards; to establish or improve, and enforce, eligibility verification 
. and enforcement; to restrict the amount of service any single recipient can 
obtain. 
These propositions can be illustrated with reference to the federal surplus 
commodity distribution program. In 1982, when the program was just getting 
started, it emphasised giving. away as much food as possible through networks of 
private agencies, which first had to be located and then persuaded to participate. 
However, when the program was cut back sharply a year later in response to 
food retailers' complaints that the program was hurting their sales, the federal 
Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) began to worry that the mismatch between the 
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number of people eligible to receive food and the amount of food available 
would become too great. · Accordingly, it promulgated regulations which 
required states to establish more precise and restrictive eligibility guidelines, and 
it started procedures to insure that those guidelines were being followed. The 
FNS later proposed regulations that would further tighten the loose verification 
procedures of the food banks and soup kitchens. 
It is evident that in developing policy for nonprofit contractors, 
governments often see the contract for services as a resource by which it can 
achieve ancillary service goals. Government seeks not only to provide services 
in general, but to improve its performance in other aspects of its activities. Thus, 
the Massachusetts Department of Social Services (DSS) reduced the number of 
contracts that pennitted agencies to take referrals from any source (known as 
open referral contracts) and instead required the agencies to take referrals only 
from DSS staff (known as closed referrals tontracts). The state did the same 
with its daycare slots to support its employment and training programs for 
welfare recipients, and restricted the use of some of its subsidised housing 
vouchers to support its policies to reduce homelessness. 
In the interest of equity, government standards push nonprofit agencies to 
broaden their client mix. Thus, battered women's shelters have been required to 
expand their catchment areas and to take clients from different racial and ethnic 
communities. A community agency in Boston which was established to serve a 
predominantly hispanic community in the early 1970s now serves clients from 
the entire Boston area. 
Increasingly, government also imposes various limitations on the actual 
treatment provided by a contract agency. Battered women's shelters have been 
required to limit the amount of time women can stay in the shelters, although the 
shelters prefer to allow women to stay until they are deemed able to act 
independent! y. 
Similar pressures are felt by old-line agencies whose traditional policies and 
practice of family social service encouraged working with the family until it was 
judged to be stable and well, or well-enough, adjusted. Government contracts, 
however, require the agencies to limit (say, to a year) the amount of time any 
single family receives counseling from a caseworker. While this shift prevents 
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